

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND**

KWAME DAPAAH-SIAKWAN, on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE RETINA GROUP OF WASHINGTON,  
PLLC,

Defendant.

Case No.: 8:24-cv-00016-TDC

**FIRST AMENDED CLASS  
ACTION COMPLAINT**

**JURY DEMAND**

**PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff Kwame Dapaah-Siakwan (“Plaintiff”) brings this First Amended Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant The Retina Group of Washington, PLLC (“RGW” or “Defendant”) as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to his own actions and his counsels’ investigation, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

**NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1. This class action arises out of the recent cyberattack and data breach (“Data Breach”) resulting from RGW’s failure to implement reasonable and industry standard data security practices.

2. Plaintiff brings this Complaint against Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard the sensitive information that it collected and maintained as part of its regular business practices, including, but not limited to names, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers or other government-issued identification numbers, addresses, telephone numbers, demographic

information, payment information, Social Security numbers ("personally identifying information" or "PII") and medical and health insurance information, which is protected health information ("PHI", and collectively with PII, "Private Information") as defined by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA").

3. According to the untitled letter that Defendant sent to Plaintiff and other impacted Class Members (the "Notice Letter"), on March 26, 2023, Defendant "began experiencing difficulty accessing information in some of [its] systems."<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, Defendant "initiated a privileged and confidential investigation[.]"<sup>2</sup> As a result of its investigation, Defendant concluded that "the Incident resulted in the unauthorized acquisition of some of our patients' information[.]"<sup>3</sup>

4. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose Private Information was compromised as a result of Defendant's failure to: (i) adequately protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of Defendant's inadequate information security practices; and (iii) effectively secure hardware containing protected Private Information using reasonable and effective security procedures free of vulnerabilities and incidents. Defendant's conduct amounts at least to negligence and violates federal and state statutes.

5. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered injuries as a result of Defendant's conduct. These injuries include: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences

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<sup>1</sup> The "Notice Letter". A sample copy is available at <https://www.rgw.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/FINAL-6.30.23-RGW-Website-Notice.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

of the Data Breach; (vii) experiencing an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; (viii) statutory damages; (ix) Plaintiff experiencing fraudulent charges, for approximately \$20, to his Wells Fargo debit card, in or about November 2023; (x) Plaintiff's Private Information being disseminated on the dark web; (xi) Plaintiff's credit score being damaged; (xii) nominal damages; and (xiii) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

6. Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms and prevent any future data compromise on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons whose personal data was compromised and stolen as a result of the Data Breach and who remain at risk due to Defendant's inadequate data security practices.

### **PARTIES**

7. Plaintiff Kwame Dapaah-Siakwan is and has been, at all relevant times, a resident and citizen of Sterling, Virginia.

8. Defendant The Retina Group of Washington, PLLC is a Virginia limited liability company, with its principal place of business located in Greenbelt, Maryland.

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

9. This Court has original jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because at least one member of the putative Class, as defined below, is a citizen of a different state than Defendant,<sup>4</sup> there are more than 100 putative class members, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million exclusive of interest and costs.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the report submitted to the Massachusetts state government, 464 Massachusetts residents were impacted in the Data Breach. See <https://www.mass.gov/doc/data-breach-report-2023/download>

10. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it maintains its principal place of business in this District, regularly conducts business in Maryland, and has sufficient minimum contacts in Maryland.

11. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(b) because Defendant's principal place of business is in this District and a substantial part of the events, acts, and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this District.

### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

#### ***Defendant's Business***

12. Defendant is a healthcare company that provides medical services to its patients, including "specialized ophthalmology for retina diseases and vitreoretinal surgery" and "procedures in treating retinal diseases, conditions and disorders."<sup>5</sup>

13. In order to obtain medical services from Defendant, Defendant requires its patients to provide sensitive and confidential Private Information, including their names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and other sensitive information.

14. Defendant retains and store this information and derive a substantial economic benefit from the Private Information that they collect. But for the collection of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, Defendant would be unable to perform its services.

15. The information held by Defendant in its computer systems included the unencrypted Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members.

16. By obtaining, collecting, and storing the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should have known that they were responsible for protecting the Private Information from disclosure.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.rgw.com/>

17. Upon information and belief, Defendant made promises and representations to its patients that the Private Information collected from them as a condition of obtaining medical services at RGW would be kept safe, confidential, that the privacy of that information would be maintained, and that Defendant would delete any sensitive information after it was no longer required to maintain it.

18. Indeed, Defendant provides on its website that: “[w]e are required by law to: [] make sure that medical information that identifies you is kept private[.]”<sup>6</sup>

19. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Defendant provides every patient with a HIPAA compliant disclosure form in which it represents that it will protect patients’ Private Information.

20. Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant with the reasonable expectation and mutual understanding that Defendant would comply with its obligations to keep such information confidential and secure from unauthorized access.

21. Plaintiff and the Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of their Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members relied on the sophistication of Defendant to keep their Private Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for necessary purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information. Plaintiff and Class Members value the confidentiality of their Private Information and demand security to safeguard their Private Information.

22. Defendant had obligations created by the FTC Act, HIPAA, contract, and industry standards, to keep its patients’ Private Information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and disclosure.

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<sup>6</sup> <https://prismvisiongroup.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/PRISM-Notice-of-Privacy-Practices-Revised-2.21.22.pdf>

***The Data Breach***

23. On or about December 22, 2023, Defendant began sending Plaintiff and other victims of the Data Breach an untitled letter (the "Notice Letter"), informing them, in relevant part, that:

**What Happened?** On March 26, 2023, we began experiencing difficulty accessing information in some of our systems. Immediately upon becoming aware that we were experiencing a potential security incident, we took steps to secure the affected systems. We determined that we were the victim of a cybersecurity incident, initiated a privileged and confidential investigation, and reported the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While our investigation of the Incident is ongoing, we have determined that the Incident resulted in the unauthorized acquisition of some of our patients' information, and we are in the process of identifying and notifying impacted patients.

**What Information Was Involved?** Although the information involved varied among the impacted patients, the information may have included your name, Social Security number, driver's license number or other government-issued identification number, medical record number, address, telephone number, email address, date of birth, date of service, and/or other demographic information as well as health, payment, and/or insurance information.<sup>7</sup>

24. Defendant did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the sensitive information it was maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of Private Information, such as encrypting the information or deleting it when it is no longer needed.

25. The attacker accessed and acquired files in Defendant's computer systems containing unencrypted Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, including their names, dates of birth, PHI, and Social Security numbers. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information was accessed and stolen in the Data Breach.

***Data Breaches Are Preventable***

26. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "[p]revention is the most

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<sup>7</sup> Notice Letter.

effective defense against ransomware and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”<sup>8</sup>

27. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks and/or ransomware attacks Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following measures:

- Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets, employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of ransomware and how it is delivered.
- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching end users.
- Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
- Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.
- Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.

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<sup>8</sup> See How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE, at 3, available at <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view>

- Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full office suite applications.
- Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized environment.
- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.<sup>9</sup>

28. Given that Defendant was storing the sensitive Private Information of its current and former patients, Defendant could and should have implemented all of the above measures to prevent and detect cyberattacks. The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in the Data Breach and the exposure of the Private Information of more than four hundred thousand individuals,<sup>10</sup> including that of Plaintiff and Class Members.

***Defendant Knew, Or Should Have Known, Of The Risk Because Healthcare Entities In Possession Of Private Information Are Particularly Susceptible To Cyber Attacks***

29. Data thieves regularly target companies like Defendant's due to the highly sensitive information that they custody. Defendant knew and understood that unprotected Private

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<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> [https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach\\_report.jsf](https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf)

Information is valuable and highly sought after by criminal parties who seek to illegally monetize that Private Information through unauthorized access.

30. In the third quarter of the 2023 fiscal year alone, 7333 organizations experienced data breaches, resulting in 66,658,764 individuals' personal information being compromised.<sup>11</sup>

31. In light of recent high profile cybersecurity incidents at other healthcare partner and provider companies, including American Medical Collection Agency (25 million patients, March 2019), University of Washington Medicine (974,000 patients, December 2018), Florida Orthopedic Institute (640,000 patients, July 2020), Wolverine Solutions Group (600,000 patients, September 2018), Oregon Department of Human Services (645,000 patients, March 2019), Elite Emergency Physicians (550,000 patients, June 2020), Magellan Health (365,000 patients, April 2020), and BJC Health System (286,876 patients, March 2020), Defendant knew or should have known that its electronic records would be targeted by cybercriminals.

32. Despite the prevalence of public announcements of data breach and data security compromises, Defendant failed to take appropriate steps to protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members from being compromised.

33. As a custodian of Private Information, Defendant knew, or should have known, the importance of safeguarding the Private Information entrusted to it by Plaintiff and Class members, and of the foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached, including the significant costs imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach.

34. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant's data security system was breached,

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<sup>11</sup> See <https://www.idtheftcenter.org/publication/q3-data-breach-2023-analysis/>

including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach.

35. Defendant was, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the significant volume of data on Defendant's server(s), amounting to more than four hundred thousand individuals' detailed, Private Information, and, thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by the exposure of the unencrypted data.

36. The injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members were directly and proximately caused by Defendant's failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members.

37. In the Notice Letter, Defendant offers to provide 12 alerts of credit and theft monitoring services for Plaintiff and Class Members. This is wholly inadequate to compensate Plaintiff and Class Members as it fails to provide for the fact victims of data breaches and other unauthorized disclosures commonly face multiple years of ongoing identity theft, financial fraud, and it entirely fails to provide sufficient compensation for the unauthorized release and disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information. Moreover, Defendant's offer of credit and identity monitoring establishes that Plaintiff's and Class Members' sensitive Private Information was in fact affected, accessed, compromised, and exfiltrated from Defendant's computer systems.

38. The ramifications of Defendant's failure to keep secure the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members are long lasting and severe. Once Private Information is stolen—particularly Social Security numbers and PHI—fraudulent use of that information and damage to victims may continue for years.

39. As a healthcare entity in possession of its patients' Private Information, Defendant knew, or should have known, the importance of safeguarding the Private Information entrusted to

them by Plaintiff and Class Members and of the foreseeable consequences if its data security systems were breached. This includes the significant costs imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach. Nevertheless, Defendant failed to take adequate cybersecurity measures to prevent the Data Breach.

### ***Value of Private Information***

40. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.”<sup>12</sup> The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,” including, among other things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.”<sup>13</sup>

41. The PII of individuals remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the prices they will pay through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen identity credentials.<sup>14</sup>

42. For example, Personal Information can be sold at a price ranging from \$40 to \$200.<sup>15</sup> Criminals can also purchase access to entire company data breaches from \$900 to \$4,500.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

<sup>14</sup> *Your personal data is for sale on the dark web. Here's how much it costs*, Digital Trends, Oct. 16, 2019, available at: <https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/>

<sup>15</sup> *Here's How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web*, Experian, Dec. 6, 2017, available at: <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/>

<sup>16</sup> *In the Dark*, VPNOview, 2019, available at: <https://vpnoview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/>

43. Social Security numbers, which were compromised for some of the Class Members as alleged herein, for example, are among the worst kind of Private Information to have stolen because they may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult for an individual to change. The Social Security Administration stresses that the loss of an individual's Social Security number, as is the case here, can lead to identity theft and extensive financial fraud:

A dishonest person who has your Social Security number can use it to get other personal information about you. Identity thieves can use your number and your good credit to apply for more credit in your name. Then, they use the credit cards and don't pay the bills, it damages your credit. You may not find out that someone is using your number until you're turned down for credit, or you begin to get calls from unknown creditors demanding payment for items you never bought. Someone illegally using your Social Security number and assuming your identity can cause a lot of problems.

44. What's more, it is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of misuse of a Social Security number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of actual, ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.

45. Driver's license numbers, which were compromised in the Data Breach, are incredibly valuable. "Hackers harvest license numbers because they're a very valuable piece of information."<sup>17</sup>

46. "A driver's license can be a critical part of a fraudulent, synthetic identity – which go for about \$1200 on the Dark Web. On its own, a forged license can sell for around \$200."<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Hackers Stole Customers' License Numbers From Geico In Months-Long Breach, Forbes, Apr. 20, 2021, available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2021/04/20/hackers-stole-customers-license-numbers-from-geico-in-months-long-breach/?sh=3bda585e8658>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2021/04/20/hackers-stole-customers-license-numbers-from-geico-in-months-long-breach/?sh=3e4755c38658>

47. Victims of driver's license number theft also often suffer unemployment benefit fraud, as described in a recent New York Times article.<sup>19</sup>

48. Theft of PHI is also gravely serious: “[a] thief may use your name or health insurance numbers to see a doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance provider, or get other care. If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, your treatment, insurance and payment records, and credit report may be affected.”<sup>20</sup>

49. The greater efficiency of electronic health records brings the risk of privacy breaches. These electronic health records contain a lot of sensitive information (e.g., patient data, patient diagnosis, lab results, medications, prescriptions, treatment plans, etc.) that is valuable to cybercriminals. One patient’s complete record can be sold for hundreds of dollars on the dark web. As such, PHI/PII is a valuable commodity for which a “cyber black market” exists where criminals openly post stolen payment card numbers, Social Security numbers, and other personal information on several underground internet websites. Unsurprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry is at high risk and is acutely affected by cyberattacks, like the Data Breach here.

50. Between 2005 and 2019, at least 249 million people were affected by healthcare data breaches.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, during 2019 alone, over 41 million healthcare records were exposed, stolen, or unlawfully disclosed in 505 data breaches.<sup>22</sup> In short, these sorts of data breaches are

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<sup>19</sup> *How Identity Thieves Took My Wife for a Ride*, NY Times, April 27, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/your-money/identity-theft-auto-insurance.html>

<sup>20</sup> *Medical I.D. Theft*, E Fraud Prevention <https://efraudprevention.net/home/education/?a=187#:~:text=A%20thief%20may%20use%20your,credit%20report%20may%20be%20affected.>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7349636/#B5-healthcare-08-00133/>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.hipaajournal.com/december-2019-healthcare-data-breach-report/>

increasingly common, especially among healthcare systems, which account for 30.03 percent of overall health data breaches, according to cybersecurity firm Tenable.<sup>23</sup>

51. Based on the foregoing, the information compromised in the Data Breach is significantly more valuable than the loss of, for example, credit card information in a retailer data breach because, there, victims can cancel or close credit and debit card accounts. The information compromised in this Data Breach is impossible to “close” and difficult, if not impossible, to change—names, dates of birth, PHI, and Social Security numbers.

52. This data demands a much higher price on the black market. Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “Compared to credit card information, personally identifiable information . . . [is] worth more than 10x on the black market.”<sup>24</sup>

53. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for years. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also between when Private Information is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> <https://www.tenable.com/blog/healthcare-security-ransomware-plays-a-prominent-role-in-covid-19-era-breaches/>

<sup>24</sup> Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers*, IT World, (Feb. 6, 2015), available at: <https://www.networkworld.com/article/2880366/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html>

<sup>25</sup> *Report to Congressional Requesters*, GAO, at 29 (June 2007), available at: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-737.pdf>

54. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their Private Information.

***Defendant Fails To Comply With FTC Guidelines***

55. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated numerous guides for businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.

56. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. These guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal patient information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any security problems.<sup>26</sup>

57. The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.<sup>27</sup>

58. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain Private Information longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for

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<sup>26</sup> *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016). Available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136\\_proteting-personal-information.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> *Id.*

suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented reasonable security measures.

59. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to adequately and reasonably protect patient data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential patient data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security obligations.

60. These FTC enforcement actions include actions against healthcare entities, like Defendant. *See, e.g., In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., a corp,* 2016-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 79708, 2016 WL 4128215, at \*32 (MSNET July 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission concludes that LabMD’s data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an unfair act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.”).

61. Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect Private Information. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis of Defendant’s duty in this regard.

62. Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices. Defendant’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to its patients’ Private Information or to comply with applicable industry standards constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

63. Upon information and belief, Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the Private Information of its patients, Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions that would result from its failure to do so. Accordingly, Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of Private Information it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

***Defendant Fails To Comply With HIPAA Guidelines***

64. Defendant is a covered entity under HIPAA (45 C.F.R. § 160.102) and is required to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule and Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A and E (“Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information”), and Security Rule (“Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information”), 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A and C.

65. Defendant is subject to the rules and regulations for safeguarding electronic forms of medical information pursuant to the Health Information Technology Act (“HITECH”).<sup>28</sup> See 42 U.S.C. §17921, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

66. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information* establishes national standards for the protection of health information.

67. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information* establishes a national set of security standards for protecting health information that is kept or transferred in electronic form.

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<sup>28</sup> HIPAA and HITECH work in tandem to provide guidelines and rules for maintaining protected health information. HITECH references and incorporates HIPAA.

68. HIPAA requires “compl[iance] with the applicable standards, implementation specifications, and requirements” of HIPAA “with respect to electronic protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.302.

69. “Electronic protected health information” is “individually identifiable health information … that is (i) transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic media.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

70. HIPAA’s Security Rule requires Defendant to do the following:

- a. Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits;
- b. Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such information;
- c. Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such information that are not permitted; and
- d. Ensure compliance by its workforce.

71. HIPAA also requires Defendant to “review and modify the security measures implemented … as needed to continue provision of reasonable and appropriate protection of electronic protected health information.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e). Additionally, Defendant is required under HIPAA to “[i]mplement technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to those persons or software programs that have been granted access rights.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1).

72. HIPAA and HITECH also obligated Defendant to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations, and to protect against uses or disclosures of electronic protected health information that are reasonably anticipated but not permitted by the privacy rules. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) and § 164.306(a)(3); *see also* 42 U.S.C. §17902.

73. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400-414, also requires Defendant to provide notice of the Data Breach to each affected individual “without unreasonable delay and ***in no case later than 60 days following discovery of the breach.***”<sup>29</sup>

74. HIPAA requires a covered entity to have and apply appropriate sanctions against members of its workforce who fail to comply with the privacy policies and procedures of the covered entity or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subparts D or E. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(e).

75. HIPAA requires a covered entity to mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful effect that is known to the covered entity of a use or disclosure of protected health information in violation of its policies and procedures or the requirements of 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart E by the covered entity or its business associate. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(f).

76. HIPAA also requires the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”), within the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to issue annual guidance documents on the provisions in the HIPAA Security Rule. *See* 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-164.318. For example, “HHS has developed guidance and tools to assist HIPAA covered entities in identifying and implementing the most cost effective and appropriate administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of e-PHI and comply with the risk analysis requirements

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<sup>29</sup> Breach Notification Rule, U.S. Dept of Health & Human Services, <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html> (emphasis added).

of the Security Rule.” US Department of Health & Human Services, Security Rule Guidance Material.<sup>30</sup> The list of resources includes a link to guidelines set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which OCR says, “represent the industry standard for good business practices with respect to standards for securing e-PHI.” US Department of Health & Human Services, Guidance on Risk Analysis.<sup>31</sup>

***Defendant Fails To Comply With Industry Standards***

77. As noted above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify healthcare entities in possession of Private Information as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the value of the Private Information which they collect and maintain.

78. Several best practices have been identified that, at a minimum, should be implemented by healthcare entities in possession of Private Information, like Defendant, including but not limited to: educating all employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security, including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware software; encryption, making data unreadable without a key; multi-factor authentication; backup data and limiting which employees can access sensitive data. Defendant failed to follow these industry best practices, including a failure to implement multi-factor authentication.

79. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard in the healthcare industry include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security systems; protection against any possible communication system; training staff regarding critical points. Defendant failed to follow these cybersecurity best practices, including failure to train staff.

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<sup>30</sup> <http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/index.html>.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/guidance-risk-analysis/index.html>

80. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including without limitation PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.

81. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards in the healthcare industry, and upon information and belief, Defendant failed to comply with at least one—or all—of these accepted standards, thereby opening the door to the threat actor and causing the Data Breach.

#### **COMMON INJURIES & DAMAGES**

82. As a result of Defendant's ineffective and inadequate data security practices, the Data Breach, and the foreseeable consequences of Private Information ending up in the possession of criminals, the risk of identity theft to the Plaintiff and Class Members has materialized and is imminent, and Plaintiff and Class Members have all sustained actual injuries and damages, including: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's

possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

***The Data Breach Increases Plaintiff's & Class Members' Risk Of Identity Theft***

83. As Plaintiff has already experienced, the unencrypted Private Information of Class Members will end up for sale on the dark web as that is the *modus operandi* of hackers.

84. Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information is of great value to hackers and cyber criminals, and the data stolen in the Data Breach has been used and will continue to be used in a variety of sordid ways for criminals to exploit Plaintiff and Class Members and to profit off their misfortune.

85. One such example of criminals piecing together bits and pieces of compromised Private Information for profit is the development of "Fullz" packages.<sup>32</sup> With "Fullz" packages, cyber-criminals can cross-reference two sources of Private Information to marry unregulated data available elsewhere to criminally stolen data with an astonishingly complete scope and degree of accuracy in order to assemble complete dossiers on individuals.

86. The development of "Fullz" packages means here that the stolen Private Information from the Data Breach can easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff's and Class

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<sup>32</sup> "Fullz" is fraudster speak for data that includes the information of the victim, including, but not limited to, the name, address, credit card information, social security number, date of birth, and more. As a rule of thumb, the more information you have on a victim, the more money that can be made off of those credentials. Fullz are usually pricier than standard credit card credentials, commanding up to \$100 per record (or more) on the dark web. Fullz can be cashed out (turning credentials into money) in various ways, including performing bank transactions over the phone with the required authentication details in-hand. Even "dead Fullz," which are Fullz credentials associated with credit cards that are no longer valid, can still be used for numerous purposes, including tax refund scams, ordering credit cards on behalf of the victim, or opening a "mule account" (an account that will accept a fraudulent money transfer from a compromised account) without the victim's knowledge. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, *Medical Records for Sale in Underground Stolen From Texas Life Insurance Firm*, Krebs on Security (Sep. 18, 2014), [https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-\]\(https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-finn/](https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/medical-records-for-sale-in-underground-stolen-from-texas-life-insurance-)

Members' phone numbers, email addresses, and other unregulated sources and identifiers. In other words, even if certain information such as emails, phone numbers, or credit card numbers may not be included in the Private Information that was exfiltrated in the Data Breach, criminals may still easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher price to unscrupulous operators and criminals (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.

***Loss Of Time To Mitigate The Risk Of Identity Theft And Fraud***

87. As a result of the recognized risk of identity theft, when a Data Breach occurs, and an individual is notified by a company that their Private Information was compromised, as in this Data Breach, the reasonable person is expected to take steps and spend time to address the dangerous situation, learn about the breach, and otherwise mitigate the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft or fraud. Failure to spend time taking steps to review accounts or credit reports could expose the individual to greater financial harm – yet, the resource and asset of time has been lost.

88. Thus, due to the actual and imminent risk of identity theft, Defendant instructs, in its Notice Letter, Plaintiff and Class Members to take the following measures to protect himself: “we encourage patients to remain vigilant against incidents of identity theft and fraud, to review their account and explanation of benefits statements, and to monitor their free credit reports for suspicious activity and to detect errors.”<sup>33</sup>

89. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent, and will spend additional time in the future, on a variety of prudent actions, such as researching the Data Breach to verify the incident and obtain more details on its occurrence, changing passwords and resecuring their own computer

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<sup>33</sup> Notice Letter.

networks, contacting financial institutions to sort out fraudulent activity on their accounts, and replacing impacted debit and/or credit cards.

90. Plaintiff's mitigation efforts are consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office that released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches ("GAO Report") in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face "substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good name and credit record."<sup>34</sup>

91. Plaintiff's mitigation efforts are also consistent with the steps that FTC recommends that data breach victims take several steps to protect their personal and financial information after a data breach, including: contacting one of the credit bureaus to place a fraud alert (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for seven years if someone steals their identity), reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent charges from their accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit reports.<sup>35</sup>

92. And for those Class Members who experience actual identity theft and fraud, the United States Government Accountability Office released a report in 2007 regarding data breaches ("GAO Report") in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face "substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good name and credit record."<sup>[4]</sup>

#### ***Diminution Of Value Of Private Information***

93. PII and PHI are valuable property rights.<sup>36</sup> Their value is axiomatic, considering the value of Big Data in corporate America and the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy prison

<sup>34</sup> See United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown (June 2007), <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.

<sup>35</sup> See Federal Trade Commission, *Identity Theft.gov*, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps>

<sup>36</sup> See "Data Breaches Are Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is Unknown," p. 2, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 2007, <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> ("GAO Report").

sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private Information has considerable market value.

94. Sensitive PII can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to the Infosec Institute.<sup>37</sup>

95. An active and robust legitimate marketplace for PII also exists. In 2019, the data brokering industry was worth roughly \$200 billion.<sup>38</sup>

96. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, which has an inherent market value in both legitimate and dark markets, has been damaged and diminished by its compromise and unauthorized release. However, this transfer of value occurred without any consideration paid to Plaintiff or Class Members for their property, resulting in an economic loss. Moreover, the Private Information is now readily available, and the rarity of the Data has been lost, thereby causing additional loss of value.

97. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the importance of safeguarding the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant's data security system was breached, including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach.

#### ***Future Cost Of Credit And Identity Theft Monitoring Is Reasonable And Necessary***

98. Given the type of targeted attack in this case, sophisticated criminal activity, the type of Private Information involved, and Plaintiff's Private Information already being

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<sup>37</sup> See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al, Corporate Privacy Trend: The "Value" of Personally Identifiable Information ("Private Information") Equals the "Value" of Financial Assets, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at \*3-4 (2009) ("Private Information, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.") (citations omitted).

<sup>38</sup> See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015), <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>

disseminated on the dark web (as discussed below), there is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been placed, or will be placed, on the black market/dark web for sale and purchase by criminals intending to utilize the Private Information for identity theft crimes – e.g., opening bank accounts in the victims’ names to make purchases or to launder money; file false tax returns; take out loans or lines of credit; or file false unemployment claims.

99. Such fraud may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later. An individual may not know that his or her Private Information was used to file for unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the individual’s employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered only when an individual’s authentic tax return is rejected. Consequently, Plaintiff and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft for many years into the future. The retail cost of credit monitoring and identity theft monitoring can cost around \$200 a year per Class Member. This is a reasonable and necessary cost to monitor to protect Class Members from the risk of identity theft that arose from Defendant’s Data Breach.

***Loss of Benefit of the Bargain***

100. Furthermore, Defendant’s poor data security deprived Plaintiff and Class Members of the benefit of their bargain. When agreeing to obtain medical services at Defendant under certain terms, Plaintiff and other reasonable patients understood and expected that Defendant would properly safeguard and protect their Private Information, when in fact, Defendant did not provide the expected data security. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members received medical services of a lesser value than what they reasonably expected to receive under the bargains they struck with Defendant.

***Plaintiff Kwame Dapaah-Siakwan's Experience***

101. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan is a RGW patient who obtained medical services there in or about 2023.

102. As a condition of obtaining medical services at RGW, Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan was required to provide Defendant with his Private Information, including his name, date of birth, Social Security information, and other sensitive information.

103. Upon information and belief, at the time of the Data Breach, Defendant retained Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan' Private Information in its system.

104. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan is very careful about sharing his sensitive Private Information. Plaintiff stores any documents containing his Private Information in a safe and secure location. He has never knowingly transmitted unencrypted sensitive Private Information over the internet or any other unsecured source.

105. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan received the Notice Letter, by U.S. mail, directly from Defendant, dated December 12, 2023, informing his that his Private Information was improperly accessed and obtained by unauthorized third parties during the Data Breach, including his name, Social Security number, driver's license number or other government-issued identification number, medical record number, address, telephone number, email address, date of birth, date of service, and/or other demographic information as well as health, payment, and/or insurance information.

106. As a result of the Data Breach and at the direction of the Notice Letter, which instructs Plaintiff to "remain vigilant against incidents of identity theft and fraud, to review their account and explanation of benefits statements, and to monitor their free credit reports for

suspicious activity and to detect errors[,]”<sup>39</sup> Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan made reasonable efforts to mitigate the impact of the Data Breach, including but not limited to: researching the Data Breach to verify the incident and obtain more details on its occurrence, changing passwords and resecuring his own computer network, contacting financial institutions to sort out fraudulent activity on their accounts, and replacing impacted debit cards. Plaintiff has spent significant time on activities in response to the Data Breach—valuable time Plaintiff otherwise would have spent on other activities, including but not limited to work and/or recreation. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

107. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan suffered actual injury from having his Private Information compromised as a result of the Data Breach including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of his Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) statutory damages; (viii) nominal damages; and (ix) the continued and certainly increased risk to his Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant’s possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

108. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan also suffered actual injury in the form of experiencing fraudulent charges, for approximately \$20, to his Wells Fargo debit card, in or about November 2023, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data Breach.

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<sup>39</sup> Notice Letter.

109. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan further suffered actual injury in the form of his credit score being damaged, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data Breach.

110. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan further suffered actual injury in the form of experiencing an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails, which, upon information and belief, was caused by the Data Breach.

111. The Data Breach has caused Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan to suffer fear, anxiety, and stress, which has been compounded by the fact that Defendant has still not fully informed him of key details about the Data Breach's occurrence.

112. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan anticipates spending considerable time on an ongoing basis to try to mitigate and address harms caused by the Data Breach.

113. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan is at a present risk and will continue to be at increased risk of identity theft and fraud for years to come.

114. Plaintiff Dapaah-Siakwan has a continuing interest in ensuring that his Private Information, which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected and safeguarded from future breaches.

#### **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

115. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate:

##### **Nationwide Class**

All persons in the United States whose Private Information was maintained on Defendant's computer systems that were compromised in the Data Breach announced by Defendant in December 2023 (the "Class").

116. Excluded from the Class are Defendant's officers and directors, and any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; and the affiliates, legal representatives, attorneys,

successors, heirs, and assigns of Defendant. Excluded also from the Class are members of the judiciary to whom this case is assigned, their families and members of their staff.

117. Numerosity. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. According to the report submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, at least 455,000 individuals had their Private Information compromised in the Data Breach.<sup>40</sup>

118. Commonality. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:

- a. Whether Defendant unlawfully used, maintained, lost, or disclosed Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information;
- b. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- c. Whether Defendant's data security systems prior to and during the Data Breach were consistent with industry standards;
- d. Whether computer hackers obtained Class Members' Private Information in the Data Breach;
- e. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members suffered legally cognizable damages as a result of Defendant's misconduct;
- f. Whether Defendant's conduct was negligent;

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<sup>40</sup>[https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach\\_report.jsf](https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf)

- g. Whether Defendant breached implied contracts for adequate data security with Plaintiff and Class Members;
- h. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched by retention of the monetary benefits conferred on it by Plaintiff and Class Members; and
- i. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages, civil penalties, punitive damages, and/or injunctive relief.

119. Typicality. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of other Class Members because Plaintiff's Private Information, like that of every other Class Member, was compromised in the Data Breach.

120. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Members of the Class. Plaintiff's Counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions.

121. Predominance. Defendant has engaged in a common course of conduct toward Plaintiff and Class Members, in that all the Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information was stored on the same computer systems and unlawfully accessed in the same way. The common issues arising from Defendant's conduct affecting Class Members set out above predominate over any individualized issues.

122. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation. Absent a class action, most Class Members would likely find that the cost of litigating their individual claims is prohibitively high and would therefore have no effective remedy.

123. Finally, all Members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable. Defendant has access to Class Members' names and addresses affected by the Data Breach. Class Members have already been preliminarily identified and sent notice letters by Defendant.

**COUNT I**  
**Negligence**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members)**

124. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.

125. Defendant knowingly collected, came into possession of, and maintained Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information, and had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding, securing and protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties.

126. Defendant had, and continues to have, a duty to timely disclose that Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information within its possession was compromised and precisely the type(s) of information that were compromised.

127. Defendant had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the loss or unauthorized dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information.

128. Defendant systematically failed to provide adequate security for data in its possession.

129. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and Class members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information within Defendant's possession.

130. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and Class members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and prevent dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information.

131. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to timely disclose to Plaintiff and Class members that their Private Information within Defendant's possession might have been compromised and precisely the type of information compromised.

132. Defendant's breach of duties owed to Plaintiff's and Class members' caused Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information to be compromised.

133. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered injuries, including, but not limited to: (i) invasion of privacy; (ii) theft of their Private Information; (iii) lost or diminished value of Private Information; (iv) lost time and opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (v) loss of benefit of the bargain; (vi) lost opportunity costs associated with attempting to mitigate the actual consequences of the Data Breach; (vii) experiencing an increase in spam calls, texts, and/or emails; (viii) statutory damages; (ix) Plaintiff experiencing fraudulent charges, for approximately \$20, to his Wells Fargo debit card, in or about November 2023; (x) Plaintiff's Private Information being disseminated on the dark web; (xi) Plaintiff's credit score being damaged; (xii) nominal damages; and (xiii) the continued and certainly increased risk to their Private Information, which: (a) remains unencrypted and available for unauthorized third parties to access and abuse; and (b) remains backed up in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the Private Information.

134. In failing to secure Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information and promptly notifying them of the Data Breach, Defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in that Defendant acted or failed to act with a willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiff's and Class members' rights.

135. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of the Class in the form of an order (1) compelling Defendant to institute appropriate data collection and safeguarding methods and policies with regard to patient information; and (2) compelling Defendant to provide detailed and specific disclosure of what types of Private Information have been compromised as a result of the data breach.

**COUNT II**  
**Breach of Implied Contract**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members)**

136. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if fully set forth herein.

137. Plaintiff and Class Members were required to provide their Private Information to Defendant as a condition of receiving medical services at Defendant.

138. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their Private Information to Defendant. In so doing, Plaintiff and the Class entered into implied contracts with Defendant by which Defendant agreed to safeguard and protect such information, to keep such information secure and confidential, and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiff and the Class if their data had been breached and compromised or stolen.

139. In entering into such implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably believed and expected that Defendant's data security practices complied with relevant laws and regulations and were consistent with industry standards.

140. Implicit in the agreement between Plaintiff and Class Members and the Defendant to provide Private Information, was the latter's obligation to: (a) use such Private Information for business purposes only, (b) take reasonable steps to safeguard that Private Information, (c) prevent unauthorized disclosures of the Private Information, (d) provide Plaintiff and Class Members with prompt and sufficient notice of any and all unauthorized access and/or theft of their Private Information, (e) reasonably safeguard and protect the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members from unauthorized disclosure or uses, (f) retain the Private Information only under conditions that kept such information secure and confidential.

141. The mutual understanding and intent of Plaintiff and Class Members on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other, is demonstrated by their conduct and course of dealing.

142. Defendant solicited, offered, and invited Plaintiff and Class Members to provide their Private Information as part of Defendant's regular business practices. Plaintiff and Class Members accepted Defendant's offers and provided their Private Information to Defendant.

143. In accepting the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant understood and agreed that it was required to reasonably safeguard the Private Information from unauthorized access or disclosure.

144. On information and belief, at all relevant times Defendant promulgated, adopted, and implemented written privacy policies whereby it expressly promised Plaintiff and Class Members that it would only disclose Private Information under certain circumstances, none of which relate to the Data Breach.

145. On information and belief, Defendant further promised to comply with industry standards and to make sure that Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information would remain protected.

146. Plaintiff and Class Members paid money and provided their Private Information to Defendant with the reasonable belief and expectation that Defendant would use part of its earnings to obtain adequate data security. Defendant failed to do so.

147. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to Defendant in the absence of the implied contract between them and Defendant to keep their information reasonably secure.

148. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have entrusted their Private Information to Defendant in the absence of their implied promise to monitor their computer systems and networks to ensure that it adopted reasonable data security measures.

149. Plaintiff and Class Members fully and adequately performed their obligations under the implied contracts with Defendant.

150. Defendant breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiff and the Class by failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to delete the information of Plaintiff and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide accurate notice to them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.

151. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members sustained damages, as alleged herein, including the loss of the benefit of the bargain.

152. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to compensatory, consequential, and nominal damages suffered as a result of the Data Breach.

153. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to injunctive relief requiring Defendant to, *e.g.*, (i) strengthen its data security systems and monitoring procedures; (ii) submit to future annual audits of those systems and monitoring procedures; and (iii) immediately provide adequate credit monitoring to all Class Members.

**COUNT III**  
**Unjust Enrichment**  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members)**

154. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations, as if fully set forth herein, and brings this claim in the alternative to the breach of implied contract count above.

155. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant. Specifically, they paid Defendant for medical services from Defendant as well as provided Defendant with their Private Information. In exchange, Plaintiff and Class Members should have received the medical services that were the subject of the transaction and had their Private Information protected with adequate data security.

156. Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a benefit on it in the form their Private Information and/or payments made to or on their behalf as a necessary part of their receiving medical services at Defendant. Defendant appreciated and accepted that benefit. Defendant profited from these transactions and used the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members for business purposes.

157. Upon information and belief, Defendant funds its data security measures entirely from its general revenue, including payments to or on behalf Plaintiff and Class Members.

158. As such, a portion of the payments made for the benefit of or on behalf of Plaintiff and Class Members is to be used to provide a reasonable level of data security, and the amount of the portion of each payment made that is allocated to data security is known to Defendant.

159. Defendant, however, failed to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information and, therefore, did not provide adequate data security in return for the benefit Plaintiff and Class Members provided.

160. Defendant would not be able to carry out an essential function of its regular business without the Private Information of Plaintiff and Class Members and derived revenue by using it for business purposes. Plaintiff and Class Members expected that Defendant or anyone in Defendant's position would use a portion of that revenue to fund adequate data security practices.

161. Defendant acquired the Private Information through inequitable means in that it failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.

162. If Plaintiff and Class Members knew that Defendant had not reasonably secured their Private Information, they would not have allowed their Private Information to be provided to Defendant or obtained medical services at Defendant.

163. Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs it reasonably should have expended on data security measures to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' Personal Information. Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the hacking incident, Defendant instead calculated to increase its own profit at the expense of Plaintiff and Class Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures and diverting those funds to its own profit. Plaintiff and Class Members, on the other hand, suffered as a

direct and proximate result of Defendant's decision to prioritize its own profits over the requisite security and the safety of their Private Information.

164. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted to retain the money wrongfully obtained Plaintiff and Class Members, because Defendant failed to implement appropriate data management and security measures that are mandated by industry standards.

165. Plaintiff and Class Members may not have an adequate remedy at law against Defendant, and accordingly, they plead this claim for unjust enrichment in addition to, or in the alternative to, other claims pleaded herein.

166. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

167. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm, as alleged herein.

168. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members, proceeds that they unjustly received from them. In the alternative, Defendant should be compelled to refund the amounts that Plaintiff and Class Members overpaid for Defendant's services.

#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and Class Members, requests judgment against Defendant and that the Court grants the following:

- a. For an Order certifying this action as a class action and appointing Plaintiff and his Counsel to represent the Class;

- b. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class members' Private Information; from refusing to issue prompt, complete and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class members; compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods and policies with respect to consumer data collection, storage, and safety, and to disclose with specificity the type of PII and PHI compromised during the Data Breach; requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues wrongfully retained as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;
- c. For an award of actual damages, punitive damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages, and statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined;
- d. For an award of attorneys' fees and costs, including expert witness fees;
- e. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and
- f. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all triable issues.

Dated: January 17, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

*/s/ Thomas A. Pacheco*

Thomas A. Pacheco (Bar No. 1712140091)

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